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State Redress as Public Policy: A Two-Sided Coin 
 
STEPHEN WINTER 
 
Les programmes d’indemnisation pour des blessures subies par les survivantes et 
survivants de soins obtenus hors de leur foyer sont de plus en plus communs et 
dispendieux. La contribution particulière de cet article est d’examiner ces programmes 
d’indemnisation comme forme de politique sociale. Tant les survivant.e.s que les États 
ont des intérêts dans le fonctionnement de ces programmes d’indemnisation. Certains 
de ces intérêts sont compatibles; d’autres sont manifestement conflictuels. Cet article 
se termine par la mise de l’avant une stratégie pour résoudre un conflit révélateur. 
 
Monetary redress programs that respond to injuries suffered by survivors of out-of-
home care are increasingly common and very expensive. This article’s distinctive 
contribution is to approach these redress programs as a form of social policy. Both 
survivors and states have interests in the operation of redress programs. Some of those 
interests are mutually compatible, but there are obvious conflicts as well. The article 
concludes by advocating a strategy for resolving an illustrative conflict. 
 
OVER THE PAST CENTURY, MANY STATES SUBJECTED PEOPLE in out-of-home care to 
systemic abuse and neglect. Hundreds of thousands of care survivors now seek compensation. 
Most of their claims are “historic” and pertain to injuries incurred more than a decade 
previously. As plaintiffs, survivors confront significant obstacles to litigating historic abuse 
claims, including problems of evidence, limitations defences, diffuse causation, and the costs 
of litigation.1 Litigation poses challenges for states too. States that defend themselves through 
litigation may be viewed as wasting public money on expensive procedures that re-victimize 
vulnerable survivors. A growing number of states are eschewing litigation in favour of a novel 
alternative dispute resolution process—the large-scale monetary redress program.  
State redress programs discharge compensatory liabilities by providing monetary 
payments. They are arbitral—survivors apply to have their compensatory claims adjudicated 
according to criteria that define eligibility and prescribe monetary values. In that way, redress 
programs resemble victims of crime compensation (VCC) schemes. However, VCC schemes 
are general public insurance programs; they are not designed to discharge specific liabilities 
incurred by the offending state. The importance of specific liability makes state redress 
programs similar to mass tort settlements. Yet, unlike the settlement of tort liability, as the 
recent Australian Royal Commission observes, redress programs have a marked political 
character.2 That political character is visible in the differences between a state’s legal liabilities 
and its redress provisions. Monetary values in some redress programs are substantially less 
                                                          
* Stephen Winter is a Senior Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Auckland. The article benefited from 
comments offered at conferences of the New Zealand Political Studies Association in 2018 and the Society for 
the History of Children and Youth in 2019. Geoff Kemp, Katherine Smits, and Martin Wilkinson read and 
commented on an early draft. The journal’s editors and reviewers provided important suggestions and prevented 
serious errors. The Faculty of Arts at the University of Auckland funded relevant research. 
1 Law Commission of Canada, Restoring Dignity: Responding to Child Abuse in Canadian Institutions (Ottawa, 
ON: Law Commision of Canada, 2000), online: <publications.gc.ca/site/eng/325713/publication.html> [perma 
]at 161ff; Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Final Report: Redress and Civil 
Litigation (Sydney, NSW: Commonwealth of Australia, 2015), online: 
 <www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/file-list/final_report_-
_redress_and_civil_litigation.pdf> [perma.cc/PLL7-6N2J] [Royal Commission]; Kent Roach, “Blaming the 
Victim: Canadian Law, Causation, and Residential Schools” (2014) 64:4 UTLJ 566. 
2 Royal Commission, supra note 1 at 248. 
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than legally required, while others provide significantly more. Moreover, some programs 
compensate non-tortious injuries, while the ambit of others is less than what litigation could 
include. Differences between the demands of law and the content of redress indicate the effects 
of (non-legal) political factors. 
State monetary redress programs constitute a new and contested social policy field. This 
article asks what criteria should apply to their operation. Although a number of authors discuss 
how the interests of survivors should shape program criteria,3 there has been no systemic 
discussion responding to the interests of states. By positioning redress as a form of public 
policy, this article opens a conversation of what states can be reasonably asked to do. That 
question demands attention. Redress programs are increasingly common and very expensive. 
Both states and survivors can reasonably expect that a redress program will not put either in a 
worse position, overall, than litigation. This is not guaranteed. A badly designed redress 
program can be worse for everyone. If redress is to be better than litigation, it must be made 
better. 
 
I. METHOD 
 
Corrective justice involves at least two parties—an offender and a survivor—and two forms of 
justice, procedural and substantive. But the demands of corrective justice apply differently to 
different agents in different contexts. Bridging the gap between corrective justice theory and 
state redress practice requires a contextually sensitive account of the considerations relevant to 
participating agents. This article provides (part of) such an intermediary account by describing 
states’ and survivors’ reasonable4 “criterial interests”—interests that should inform appropriate 
criteria for evaluating the substance and procedure of state redress. 
Influential models of corrective justice theory tend to depict one-time transactions 
between equal human agents.5 But states are not human: they are pluralistic institutional agents. 
Appropriate criteria for state redress programs should reflect the state’s distinct character, 
including the need for public policy tools that process hundreds or thousands of corrective 
transactions. Further, states use redress programs to discharge compensatory liability while, as 
sovereign authorities, they exercise ultimate responsibility for ensuring that justice is done—
this is one way the agents who transact redress are not equals. Redress programs need to 
mitigate that, and other, inequalities. In addition, the redress of historic abuse claims, as section 
II indicates (below), engenders distinct evidential and assessment concerns. Evaluative criteria 
for state redress programs cannot abstract from the interests of real-world agents, from the 
constraints on resources they face, nor from the consequences of differing forms of agency. 
To provide relevant empirical information, the paper draws upon a range of past and 
current redress programs, including: Ireland’s Residential Institutions Redress program (2003–
2016); two components of Canada’s Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (2006–
),the Common Experience Payments and the Individual Assessment Process; New Zealand’s 
Historic Claims Process (2008–); Western Australia’s Redress WA program (2007–2012); 
                                                          
3 Illustrative works include: Patricia Lundy, Historical Institutional Abuse: What Survivors Want from Redress 
(Ulster University, 2016), online: <www.amnesty.org.uk/files/what_survivors_want_from_redress.pdf> 
[perma.cc/8DWT-BEQL]; Suellen Murray, Supporting Adult Care-Leavers: International Good Practice 
(Bristol, UK: Policy Press, 2015); Kathleen Daly, Redressing Institutional Abuse of Children (Houndsmills: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) [Daly, Redressing Abuse]. 
4 The discussion concerns “reasonable” interests in the sense meant by Rawls: the “reasonable” is what agents can 
require from each other as free and equal beings guided by concern for justice. A full exploration of the reasonable 
interests of a state lies beyond this article, but Section 4 offers an introductory sketch. John Rawls, Political 
Liberalism: With a New Introduction and the “Reply to Habermas” (Chichester, NY: Columbia University Press, 
1996) at 49–54. 
5 See e.g. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974) at 78-84. 
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Queensland’s Redress Scheme (2007–2010); and the presently developing Australian National 
Redress Scheme (2018–). Reflection on actual practice enables the discussion to respect 
applied theory’s ambition to describe normative standards applicable to actual agents. 
Nevertheless, the following account is not comprehensive. It attends to corrective 
claims only, excluding other relevant values and practices. This is a significant limitation 
because redress is usually part of a comprehensive package alongside apologies, 
memorialization, and truth recovery initiatives.6 Moreover, the discussion’s bilateral 
character—addressing only states and survivors—excludes relevant interests of family 
members, communities, and other parties, including third-party care and service providers.  
The following two sections consider the criterial interests of survivors and states. 
Section II explores the criterial interests of survivors by engaging with the United Nation’s Van 
Boven/Bassiouni “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation 
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law” (the VBB Principles).7 Because there is no document 
analogous to the VBB Principles describing the state’s interests, section III proceeds 
comparatively, considering how a redress program may be superior to litigation as a policy tool 
for states. Carrying the discussion a step further, section IV develops a strategy for resolving 
an illustrative conflict: the acceptable limits of state liability. The result is a significant advance 
towards a more adequate account of redress program criteria. 
 
II. THE INTERESTS OF SURVIVORS 
 
The VBB Principles are an influential international instrument specifying the remedial 
responsibilities of states to survivors, including compensation. The Principles derive from a 
decades-long global consultation process, are endorsed by states in the General Assembly, and 
are used by courts and advocates to satisfy survivors’ high priority interests while avoiding or 
mitigating common problems. This section uses the VBB Principles as a guide to survivors’ 
criterial interests in “fair and impartial” access to justice before turning to survivors’ 
substantive claims for full compensation.8 
 
A. PROCEDURE 
 
Impartiality requires insulating redress procedures from arbitrary considerations. This is 
challenging when offending states act as both judge and defendant. In New Zealand, for 
example, redress programs have been run by the government ministries responsible for the 
original offending. In some cases, redress program staff worked at facilities in which abuses 
occurred.9 This lack of independence reduces the confidence survivors have in the program 
and may deter them from participating.10 The VBB Principles recognize that state-run redress 
                                                          
6 Reg Graycar & Jane Wangmann, “Redress Packages for Institutional Child Abuse: Exploring the Grandview 
Agreement as a Case Study in 'Alternative' Dispute Resolution” (2007) Sydney Law School Research Paper 07/50 
at 8; Daly, Redressing Abuse, supra note 3 at 196. 
7 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, GA Res 60/147, 
UNGAOR, 60th Sess, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/60/PV.64 (2005), online: 
<www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RemedyAndReparation.aspx> [perma.cc/VW59-XQVD]. 
8 Ibid, principle 12. 
9 Ministry of Social Development, Review of Historical Claims Resolution Process: Report on the Consultation 
Process with Māori Claimants, July 2018, (New Zealand: 2018), online: <www.msd.govt.nz/documents/about-
msd-and-our-work/work-programmes/historic-claims/feedback-from-maori-consultation.pdf> [perma.cc/G58W-
Z9J2] at 12. 
10 Elizabeth Stanley, “Responding to State Institutional Violence” (2015) 55:6 Brit J Crim 1149 at 1155. 
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programs always risk partiality. However, some programs are better than others. Several 
programs—the Irish Residential Institutions Redress program is an example—lodge 
responsibility for administering the redress with an independent tribunal. The Irish tribunal 
avoided hiring staff from offending ministries and was led by independent adjudicators with 
secure appointments and budgets. Moreover, it adjudicated claims using publicly-available 
regulations and produced written judgements that were subject to review.11 
Because impartiality entails the like treatment of like claims, the VBB principles 
prohibit “discrimination of any kind or on any ground, without exception.”12 
Nondiscrimination bars arbitrary distinctions between eligible and ineligible claims. Similarly, 
nondiscrimination favours procedural stability: other things being equal, claims should not be 
treated differently at different times. Again, existing redress programs confront difficulties: the 
beneficiaries of one program may be no more deserving of redress than excluded survivors 
with slightly different histories. For example, Queensland restricted eligibility to survivors of 
licensed institutions. That limit excluded most Indigenous survivors because they were usually 
placed in unlicensed institutions. In Canada, the Indian Residential Schools Settlement 
Agreement favoured “status Indians”13 and disfavoured Métis survivors.14 Survivors can 
reasonably reject redress programs that discriminate invidiously.  
The VBB Principles’ procedural requirements for fairness include the survivors’ 
interest in having “relevant information concerning violations and reparation mechanisms.”15 
Transparency requires survivors to know how to apply for redress and how claims will be 
assessed. Again, practice often departs from this requirement. Western Australia’s Redress WA 
program did not have assessment criteria until six months after the program began accepting 
applications.16 New Zealand’s program has never published comprehensive assessment 
information. Procedural opacity means that survivors applying for redress do not know what 
evidence is relevant to the process. 
Even when survivors know what information to provide, fairness requires that survivors 
are not unduly burdened (the VBB Principles suggest “minimiz[ing] the inconvenience … ”) 
in presenting their claims and responding to adverse evidence.17 Survivors of historic abuse 
regularly confront serious evidentiary problems that arise from the nature of the injuries and 
the time elapsed since their experience of care. The childhood experience of abuse can re-
structure brain development, leading to memories being repressed, displaced, or otherwise 
disordered in ways that impede testimony.18 Documentary evidence of abuse is rarely available: 
                                                          
11 Residential Institutions Redress Board, Annual Report of the Residential Institutions Redress Board 2015 
(Dublin, Ireland: Residential Institutions Redress Board, 2016), online: <www.rirb.ie/annualReport.asp>; 
Residential Institutions Redress Board, “Guide to Hearing Procedures” (April 2003), online: 
<www.rirb.ie/hearing.asp> [perma.cc/8NG7-F5R3]. 
12 Supra, note 7, principle 25. 
13 In Canada, individuals classified as “status Indians” are registered under the Indian Act. Indian Act, RSC 1985, 
c I-5, s 5. 
14 Tricia Logan, “A Métis Perspective on Truth and Reconciliation” in Marlene Brant Castellano, Linda Archibald 
& Mike DeGagné, eds, From Truth to Reconciliation: Transforming the Legacy of Residential Schools (Ottawa, 
ON: Aboriginal Healing Foundation, 2008) at 69. 
15 Supra, note 7, principle 11. 
16 Government of Western Australian, Redress WA Guidelines: Guidelines to Provide for an Ex Gratia Payment 
to Persons Abused and/or Neglected as Children While in State Care (Western Australia: Government of Western 
Australia, 2011), online: 
<www.findandconnect.gov.au/ref/wa/objects/pdfs/WD0000056%20Redress%20WA%20Guidelines%2018%20
May%202011.pdf> [perma.cc/9EMX-CUKA]. 
17 Supra, note 7, principle 12(b). 
18 Bessel A van der Kolk, “Child Abuse & Victimization” (2005) 35:5 Psychiatric Annals 374; Mark Kebbell & 
Nina Westera, “Investigating Historical Allegations of Sexual Abuse: The Investigation of Suspected Offenders” 
in Yorick Smaal, Andy Kaladelfos & Mark Finnane, eds, The Sexual Abuse of Children: Recognition and Redress 
(Clayton, AU: Monash University Publishing, 2016) 123. 
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individual and institutional offenders had little incentive to record injurious events. Poor 
archival practices and the loss or destruction of records pose further difficulties. Therefore, 
survivors with meritorious claims will be excluded unless redress programs relax evidentiary 
standards—most replace tort law’s “probability” with “plausibility” and some accept non-
standard evidentiary forms, such as “similar fact” evidence.19 
Resourcing presents further challenges. A proceeding against the state places survivors 
in a profoundly unequal contest. Although individuals differ, survivor populations are 
characterized by lower-than-average numeracy and literacy, high rates of morbidity, including 
mental health infirmities, lower-than-average income and wealth, and high rates of 
homelessness.20 By comparison, the financial resources of the state are nearly unlimited. And 
states have boundless resources of time. States can use those advantages to exhaust survivors. 
New Zealand’s longest claim has been open for over thirteen years.21 Lengthy litigation has 
meant that some New Zealand survivors received no more in redress than they owed in legal 
fees.22 The VBB Principles stipulate that redress should be “prompt” and unimpeded by 
unreasonable delays.23 
Expertise is another inequitably distributed resource. States have numerous legal, 
archival, and other professional staff. And they possess the subtle advantages of “repeat 
players.”24 Those advantages include the capacity to deploy long-term strategies that develop 
favourable precedents and rules. Whereas survivors usually participate in only one case (their 
own), the state employs experts who conduct hundreds of cases, enabling those officials to 
develop personal relationships with adjudicators, cultivate a reputation for credibility, and learn 
from experience. In response, the VBB Principles require “proper assistance” for survivors, 
including expert, medical, and legal support. Access to counsel is particularly important in 
redress programs for which higher monetary values require survivors to present complex 
evidence or make important decisions quickly. The VBB Principles’ demand for “effective 
access” to justice vindicates simple programs that are low-cost to engage with and require all 
stakeholders to provide pertinent information, such as relevant records or prior findings, 
proactively.25 
A fair proceeding protects the well-being of survivors. The VBB Principles stipulate 
that “appropriate measures should be taken to ensure [the survivors’] safety, physical and 
psychological well-being and privacy.”26 Survivors confront high risks of serious 
psychological damage, including re-traumatization during the redress process. Survivors must 
                                                          
19 Similar fact evidence uses information derived from injurious patterns, where similar things happened to 
different individuals. See HL Ho, “Similar Facts in Civil Cases” (2006) 26:1 Oxford J Leg Stud 131. 
20 Elizabeth Fernandez et al, No Child Should Grow up Like This: Identifying Long Term Outcomes of Forgotten 
Australians, Child Migrants and the Stolen Generations (Sydney, AU: University of New South Wales, 2016), 
online: 
<www.forgottenaustralians.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/files/uploads/UNSW_ForgottenAustralians_Report_Nov1
6.pdf> [perma.cc/EHD4-XVC4] at 227; Patricia Lundy & Kathleen Mahoney, “Representing Survivors: A 
Critical Analysis of Recommendations to Resolve Northern Ireland’s Historical Child Abuse Claims” (2018) 7 
The Annual Review of Interdisciplinary Justice Research 258 at 268; Mary Higgins, Developing a Profile of 
Survivors of Abuse in Irish Religious Institutions (Newbridge, Ireland: St. Stephen's Green Trust, 2010), online: 
<www.ssgt.ie/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Developing-a-profile-of-survivors-of-abuse-in-Irish-religious-
institutions-2010.pdf> [perma.cc/T9CU-UVTP] at 2ff. 
21 Ministry of Social Development, Claims Resolutions Quarterly Data Report for Claims Received 1 January 
2004 to 31 March 2018 (2018). Copy on file with the Author.  
22 Murray, supra note 3 at 91. 
23 Supra, note 7, principle 14. 
24 Richard C Reuben, “Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public 
Civil Justice” (2000) 47 UCLA L Rev 949 at 1065. 
25 Supra, note 7, principle 12. 
26 Ibid, principle 10. 
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describe their injuries, often on multiple occasions, in situations that are very stressful (such as 
under cross-examination). Ascertaining the physical, psychological, and cultural damage 
resulting from childhood abuse requires an intrusive assessment of the survivor’s personality 
and character, their medical and employment history, and their relationships with family and 
friends.27 Regarding privacy, specific forms of abuse may be humiliating and, for some 
survivors, to have been in out-of-home-care is shameful.28 The VBB Principles support the 
development of programs that limit re-traumatization through the reuse of testimony provided 
in other forums, the use of expert reports, similar-fact evidence, and public documents. In 
addition, the Principles suggest that survivors should not bear the costs of any medical, 
psychological, or other support services needed to pursue compensation. 
This survey of the survivor’s interests in procedural criteria concludes with a value the 
VBB Principles do not explicitly address; the interest of survivors in active participation. 
Redress programs respect survivors as agents by creating opportunities and structures within 
the program wherein survivors can act.29 Participation may occur in program design, in 
providing support services, in testifying, or in being involved in payment negotiations. 
However, because opportunities for participation are not cost-free, effective survivor 
participation requires good communal and institutional support.30 
 
B. SUBSTANCE 
 
The VBB Principles suggest survivors have both monetary and non-monetary remedial claims. 
Non-monetary remedies in the form of rehabilitation, restitution, and satisfaction are important, 
but monetary compensation has distinctive value.31 Compensation respects the survivor’s 
agency by providing the means to pursue and obtain a wide range of goods and services.32 
Unlike redress “in-kind” or through service-provision, money is extremely fungible—putting 
power in the hands of survivors.33 
The VBB Principles define compensation as a response to any “economically 
assessable damage.”34 The substantive content of the survivor’s claim depends on the nature of 
                                                          
27 Western Australian Department for Communities, Overview of Redress WA Administration: Key Learnings, 
(Undated) [unpublished] at 7.  Copy on file with the author. Undated) at 7. 
28 Ruth Emond, “Longing to Belong: Children in Residential Care and Their Experiences of Peer Relationships at 
School and in the Children's Home” (2014) 19:2 Child & Family Social Work 194; Leonie Sheedy, “Try to Put 
Yourselves in Our Skin: The Experience of Wardies and Homies” (2005) 2005:1 International Journal of Narrative 
Therapy & Community Work 65. 
29 Carlton Waterhouse, “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Moral Agency and the Role of Victims in Reparations 
Programs” (2009) 31:1 U Pa J Intl L 257. 
30 Daly, Redressing Abuse, supra note 3 at 170. 
31 To expand, the VBB Principles suggest that rehabilitation includes claims for the treatment of medical or 
psychological damage. In international law, restitution usually concerns the restoration of properties and liberties 
wrongfully taken or denied. The VBB Principles specify that restitution also includes the recovery of personal 
identity and family life. Lastly, the VBB Principles identify a range of goals and measures as claims for 
satisfaction. In general, these include researching and publishing accurate accounts of the injury, punishing 
offenders and apologies. The Principles also include a fifth category of remedy: measures to prevent re-
occurrence. But that is not a ‘remedial’ demand. 
32 Madeleine Dion Stout & Rick Harp, Lump Sum Compensation Payments Research Project: The Circle Rechecks 
Itself (Ottawa, ON: Aboriginal Healing Foundation, 2007), online: <www.ahf.ca/downloads/newest-lsp.pdf> 
[perma.cc/E9W2-GJRN] at 27. 
33 There may be cases in which in-kind provision is better for all parties. For example, one study suggests that 
“therapy could be at least 32 times more cost effective than financial compensation” in relieving psychological 
distress. Christopher J Boyce & Alex M Wood, “Money or Mental Health: The Cost of Alleviating Psychological 
Distress with Monetary Compensation Versus Psychological Therapy” (2010) 5:4 Health Economics, Policy and 
Law 509 at 509. 
34 Supra, note 7, principle 20. 
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the original wrongdoing (the experience of injury) and the effects of that wrongdoing on the 
survivor (consequential damage). As a “regulative ideal,”35 compensation should make the 
survivor as well off as they would have been had the injury not occurred. That demand is easy 
to articulate, but hard to satisfy. There may be no way to recover lost childhoods or to repair 
psychological and social damage. Nevertheless, the Principles’ ambit of compensable damage 
includes physical and mental harms, loss of opportunities, including employment, education 
and social benefits, loss of earnings and earning potential, and moral damage, which may 
include damage to family and cultural relationships, reputation, or character. The Principles 
also include the cost of any treatment needed by survivors as a result of their injury. 
To conclude this section, the VBB Principles articulate survivor-respecting program 
criteria. Reflecting their unique circumstances and capabilities, the specific content of each 
survivor’s substantive and procedural interests will differ. Nevertheless, as a regulative ideal, 
redress should fully compensate survivors through fair and impartial procedures that respect 
their situation-relevant criterial interests. 
 
III. THE INTERESTS OF STATES 
 
A state’s remedial responsibilities arise from its responsibilities for furnishing citizens with a 
reasonable framework for civic life, specifically the maintenance of just institutions.36 When a 
state fails to discharge those responsibilities by injuring a citizen, it assumes liability. That 
distinctive basis for corrective liability is matched by the state’s distinctive resourcing. States 
tax the citizenry to pay for institutions that meet basic demands of justice. Because the 
rectificatory obligations the state has towards survivors constitute part of those demands, the 
citizenry has reason to contribute resources to redress. However, citizens fund redress for the 
same generic reasons they fund other public expenditures: they are not (usually) guilty of the 
relevant wrongdoing and have countervailing claims upon the public revenue.  
States are optimizing agents that aim to serve a range of public goods efficiently. The 
state’s primary policy goal in the domain of historic abuse claims is the political resolution of 
the survivors’ salient claims. That policy goal is a regulative ideal; it does not dominate the 
state’s decision structure. Every existing state is marked by significant and persistent injustices. 
Therefore, the survivors’ redress claims are in competition with other remedial demands. In 
addition, states must balance the commitment of resources to redress against other public 
responsibilities, such as defence, medical services, and public infrastructure. The survivors’ 
just demands are, from a public policy perspective, a competing claim upon the public revenue. 
Section II’s discussion of the survivors’ criterial interests relied on an authoritative 
document (the VBB Principles). No such instrument discusses the state’s criterial interests. 
Therefore, this section proceeds differently. Because redress is a form of public policy, 
reasonable criteria are derivable from public policy analysis—at least in part. An axiom of 
public policy analysis is that the optimal relation between a policy target and a policy tool is 
one-to-one. To have more than one policy tool for a policy goal invites inefficiency. All states 
maintain a policy tool for resolving corrective obligations—the ordinary courts. This section 
proceeds comparatively, developing criterial interests by comparing redress and litigation with 
regard to the state’s policy goal of resolution. Litigation resolves claims through processes that 
are lawful, public, and effective. Redress should not detract from those procedural values. 
Substantively, redress should be efficient. 
                                                          
35 A regulative ideal is a principle or value that serves to shape action without presuming that the principle or 
value can be wholly realized. See Dorothy Emmet, The Role of the Unrealisable: A Study in Regulative Ideals 
(Houndsmills: The Macmillan Press, 1994). 
36 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971) at s 
43. 
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A. PROCEDURE 
 
Litigation assures legality—claims are resolved in conformity with public law and regulation. 
Redress programs must be equally lawful. Lawfulness requires that public money be disbursed 
only when legally authorized. Moreover, it requires program operations to conform to all 
applicable laws. That is a significant constraint. Employment law offers an illustrative 
challenge. State redress programs operate within public sector regulatory environments 
designed for stable long-term career development. Those regulations can make it difficult to 
hire and retain good staff for short-term redress programs.37 Some programs rely on temporary 
contract workers, whose insecure employment creates incentives for greater staffing turnover 
or “churn.”38 Others use existing civil servants, creating concerns with impartiality. Either way, 
lawful program staffing incurs significant procedural costs. However, while states can 
reasonably avoid inefficient investments in large numbers of new staff, the overall procedural 
costs of litigation are (often) much greater than redress. In 2013, New Zealand estimated that 
litigating a historical child abuse case cost NZD $640,000 (USD $422,400),39 excluding the 
costs of any award.40 At the time, New Zealand’s administrative costs for its redress program 
were around NZD $17,700 per claim (USD $11,682). Although redress programs should aim 
to draw upon existing human resources and infrastructure, even extensive new resourcing can 
be lawful and cost-effective. 
Section II raised the survivor’s interest in procedural transparency—programs should 
operate according to rules and procedures that are public, prospective, and stable. States have 
an analogous interest in publicity. Publicity enables people to know what rules apply and the 
extent to which agents conform to those rules. Litigation satisfies that demand with open courts 
that operate according to known rules and procedures using evidence available to, and 
contestable by, all parties.  
By testing claims to exclude non-meritorious applications, redress programs can 
provide comparable forms of publicity. Although privacy concerns may prohibit publishing the 
details of individual cases, aggregate information and robust review procedures can deliver 
program-level publicity. Assessment should approve meritorious and exclude non-meritorious 
claims. To do this, a redress program needs to obtain relevant and reliable information, 
including potentially adverse evidence. Program guidelines can instruct officials to accept 
survivor testimony as true and to use low evidentiary thresholds, but programs are accountable 
for their decisions—legally to their auditors, politically to the citizenry. “[T]he public expects 
                                                          
37 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Management Practices Review of the Resolution and Individual Affairs 
Sector (RIAS) (Ottawa, ON: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 2009), online: 
<publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.829862/publication.html>; Evaluation, Performance Measurement, and Review 
Branch, Lessons Learned Study of the Common Experience Payment Process (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
Development Canada, 2015), online: <www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ-AEV/STAGING/texte-
text/ev_lls_1468332975934_eng.pdf> [perma.cc/46UH-BNVJ] at 37–38. 
38 Indian Residential Schools Adjudication Secretariat, Annual Report, 2011: Annual Report of the Chief 
Adjudicator to the Independent Assessment Process Oversight Committee (Indian Residential Schools 
Adjudication Secretariat, 2011), online: <www.iap-pei.ca/media/information/publication/pdf/pub/ar2011-
eng.pdf> [perma.cc/9GJD-N5R5]. 
39 USD equivalents were calculated on 8 July 2019 using exchange rates of: NZD: $0.66; AUD: $0.70; CDN: 
$0.76. There is no adjustment for inflation. 
40 Office of the Minister for Social Development, Memo to the Chair, Cabinet State Sector Reform and 
Expenditure Control Committee: Resolving Historic Claims of Abuse - Proposal to Bring Funding Forward 
(2014), online: <www.msd.govt.nz/documents/about-msd-and-our-work/work-programmes/historic-
claims/cabinet-paper-proposal-to-bring-funding-forward-nov-2014.pdf> [perma.cc/N8LV-BT2V] at 2–3. 
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that a decision to pay a settlement is made only where there is good information to support that 
[decision].”41 
A last procedural interest concerns effectiveness: the adjudication of redress should 
normally be final and not regularly displaced by independent processes. Litigation serves this 
value by being a “closed system” wherein claims are adjudicated according to legal rules and 
issued by legal authorities. There is no appeal on points of law beyond the legal system. 
However, most survivors never file claims, making litigation ineffective in resolving their 
claims. Effective redress programs need to attract survivors. There is some evidence that 
plaintiffs prefer the outcomes of well-designed alternative dispute resolution programs to those 
of litigation.42 Attractive programs are easy to understand and to contact, and are characterized 
by simple, straightforward, and predictable procedures. Redress should be no slower than 
litigation (preferably much faster). Because increasing information quantity is strongly 
correlated with decreasing adjudication speed (and higher procedural costs),43 states have an 
interest in ensuring that a program’s informational infrastructure provides adjudicators with 
easily useable data. Their interest in effectiveness means that states have an interest in 
specifying the form and character of redress applications. 
 
B. SUBSTANCE 
 
States can expect redress to be more efficient than litigation—obtaining a higher value ratio of 
the policy target when compared to input costs. In terms of monetary costs, litigation is always 
expensive and sometimes risky for states. Where redress offers lower value payments, it 
releases monies that can be put toward other policy goals. To give some comparative data, one 
landmark historic abuse case, Trevorrow v State of South Australia (No 5),44 resulted in an 
award of AUD $525,000 (USD $367,500), while the maximum payout in the present Australian 
National Redress Scheme is AUD $150,000 (USD $105,000).45 Offending states may confront 
thousands of historic claims with commensurate financial risks. In 2005, a Canadian court 
certified over ten thousand plaintiffs in a class action seeking CDN $36 billion (USD $27.36 
billion) in damages.46 The risk of potential liability made Canada’s CDN $5 billion (USD $3.8 
billion) Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement, settling 79,309 claims, an efficient 
strategy.47  
Another source of efficiency is the potential for redress programs to address meritorious 
claims that litigation is incapable of resolving. Previously-noted problems of evidence, 
limitations defences, diffuse causation, and the costs of litigation (for plaintiffs) prevent states 
from discharging remedial obligations through litigation. Some meritorious claims fall beyond 
the limits of tort law; sibling-separation is a good example. With greater flexibility, 
policymakers can craft redress programs to target salient claims (and claimants). 
                                                          
41 Ministry of Social Development, News Release, “Ministry Process for Historic Claims Working Well” (24 July 
2009), online: Scoop Politics <www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO0907/S00260/ministry-process-for-historic-claims-
working-well.htm> [perma.cc/UH2Q-B5Y2]. 
42 Reuben, supra note 24 at 963. 
43 Stephen Winter, “Two Models of Monetary Redress: A Structural Analysis” (2018) 13:3 Victims & Offenders 
293. 
44 [2007] SASC 285 [Trevorrow]. 
45 National Redress Scheme for Institutional Child Sexual Abuse Act 2018 (Austl), 2018/45, s 16(1)(a). 
46 Ronald Niezen, “Templates and Exclusions: Victim Centrism in Canada's Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
on Indian Residential Schools” (2016) 22:4 Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 920 at 921. 
47 Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, Statistics on the Implementation of the Indian Residential Schools 
Settlement Agreement (Last modified on 19 February 2019), online: <www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1315320539682/1315320692192> [perma.cc/EW8U-5Z5P] [IRSSA Statistics]. 
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A good redress program should resolve more salient claims than litigation. To take a 
further step, redress programs are better when they resolve more meritorious claims. But that 
interest in resolution is balanced by a concern with costs: states have an interest in expending 
no more (ideally less) on redress than they would on litigation, while good redress programs 
resolve no fewer (ideally many more) meritorious claims than litigation. An efficient redress 
policy might optimize those two interests: if payment values decrease as the number of 
(expected) resolved claims increases, programs become more efficient, increasing the ratio of 
the achieved policy target as compared to input costs. 
To summarize points made in section III, a redress program’s operative criteria must 
respect the agency of defendant states. That requires attending to the kind of agency states 
exercise. States bear remedial obligations, however, those obligations are “on all fours” with 
other policy goals—redress is a form of public policy. This section canvassed an indicative set 
of criterial interests of states: procedurally, redress should be lawful, public, and effective, 
while substantively, redress should optimize costs and resolution efficiently. 
 
IV. CONTESTED CRITERIA 
 
Sections II and III described important criterial interests. The values of impartiality and fairness 
respect survivors’ interests in transparent redress programs that provide adequate support to 
applicants, while protecting their well-being and privacy. Substantively, survivors have an 
interest in full compensation for any meritorious claim they pursue. For states, redress 
programs will be no worse than litigation if they are lawful, public, effective, and efficient. 
This overview reveals several operative criteria that both states and survivors could reasonably 
accept. Both could endorse stable and transparent redress processes that respect reasonable 
privacy constraints, both have an interest in lower cost and speedier resolutions, both can agree 
that a redress program’s procedures should be simple and easy to use, and both can agree that 
redress should be lawful.  
The discussion also indicates potential disagreements. The need for lawful public 
employment may slow redress operations. Survivors’ privacy concerns may conflict with the 
state’s interest in robust public evidence of validity. Such conflicts will multiply. Therefore, 
policymakers require strategies for reasonable resolution. This section develops a strategy for 
resolving an illustrative conflict over compensatory values.  
Survivors have a substantive interest in full compensation. Full compensation 
completely satisfies all of the survivors’ claims for the experience of injury and any harm 
(damage) foreseeably resultant from that injury. Yet, it is often presumed that redress programs 
will not provide full compensation.48 The difference is rarely justified. Many programs present 
survivors with a “Hobson’s Choice” of partial compensation or nothing. If monetary values are 
set by what (marginalized, disadvantaged, and economically insecure) survivors are willing to 
accept, redress may insult survivors and risk equivalency with “hush money.”49 Values that are 
too low may lead to ineffective policies of resolution because they do not encourage survivors 
to accept redress, or they give reason for survivors to continue to pursue partially satisfied 
claims, or both.  
Attempts to justify partial payment sometimes point to the purported unaffordability of 
full compensation.50 The enormous resources of developed states raise questions about that 
                                                          
48 Jaime E Malamud-Goti & Lucas Sebastián Grosman, “Reparations and Civil Litigation: Compensation for 
Human Rights Violations in Transitional Democracies” in Pablo De Greiff, ed, The Handbook of Reparations 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006) 539; Royal Commission, supra note 1 at 220. 
49 Daly, Redressing Abuse, supra note 3 at 181; J R Miller, Residential Schools and Reconciliation: Canada 
Confronts Its History (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2017) at 167–69. 
50 Royal Commission, supra note 1 at 248. 
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claim: states regularly commit themselves to large expenditures underwritten by long-term debt 
financing. Other commentators suggest that characteristic injuries such as sexual abuse, 
damages done to family relationships, and lifetime illiteracy are not quantifiable.51 If survivors’ 
injuries are incalculable, then compensation is impossible, and remedial efforts might instead 
recognize the survivor’s experience, help make a positive difference in their life, or help them 
integrate socially. Such arguments shift the justificatory burden for redress from corrective 
justice to matters of distributive justice or citizenship. This detracts from the policy target; 
when redress values are unmoored from compensation, the survivors’ corrective claims are not 
resolved. And survivors can rightly point to numerous examples in litigation (like the above-
mentioned Trevorrow case) where courts award compensation for supposedly non-quantifiable 
injuries.52 
Survivors have an interest in full compensation. If redress will not fully satisfy that 
interest, policymakers need to provide publicly-acceptable strategies for discounting. One 
option is for policymakers to defend a maximum financial commitment by reference to 
competing demands on the public revenue. Survivors can endorse the authority of 
democratically elected officials to allocate public expenditure. In this “democratic” strategy, 
the justifiable discounting of monetary values will vary according to the state’s existing 
commitments and future projects—the degree to which funding must be diverted from other 
programs, or debt accrued, to satisfy the claims. However, this democratic strategy confronts 
concerns with impartiality. It will be politically challenging for officials representing an 
offending state to say to survivors that they have decided to allocate monies to other priorities. 
And observers will note the enormous resources of developed states. 
Another approach justifies reduced payouts by reference to the advantages redress 
provides to survivors as compared to litigation. For example, lower monetary values could be 
“the quid pro quo for lower barriers to participation and [less stringent] testing of evidence.”53 
That line of argument risks being unfair to survivors with meritorious claims.54 The problems 
survivors confront in litigation are usually created by legal procedure (such as technical 
defences led by the state) or by the offending state’s previous failures to fund care placements 
properly, keep appropriate records of abuse, investigate complaints, or provide timely 
                                                          
51 The Compensation Advisory Committee, Towards Redress and Recovery: Report to the Minister for Education 
and Science (Dublin, Ireland: Department of Education and Science, 2002), online: 
<www.lenus.ie/bitstream/handle/10147/45264/7030.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> [perma.cc/BBY2-HFBT] 
at 66; Marilyn Rock, Submission to the Senate Community Affairs Committee Inquiry into the Progress Made with 
the Implementation of the Recommendations into: The Child Migrant Inquiry Report, Lost Innocents: Righting 
the Record; the 2004 Report, Forgotten Australians: A Report on Australians Who Experienced Institutional or 
Out-of-Home Care as Children; the 2005 Protecting Vulnerable Children: A National Challenge Report (Western 
Australian Department for Communities, 2008), online: 
<www.aph.gov.au/~/media/wopapub/senate/committee/clac_ctte/completed_inquiries/2008_10/recs_lost_innoc
ents_forgotten_aust_rpts/submissions/sub12_pdf.ashx> [perma.cc/E4F5-JHWF] at 3; Kathleen Daly, “Money for 
Justice? Money's Meaning and Purpose as Redress for Historical Institutional Abuse” in Yorick Smaal, Andy 
Kaladelfos & Mark Finnane, eds, The Sexual Abuse of Children: Recognition and Redress (Clayton, AU: Monash 
University Publishing, 2016) 160 at 173–174; Anna Bligh, Inquiry into Government Compensation Schemes: 
Queensland Government Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
(Queensland, AU: Queensland Government, 2010), online: 
<www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=52ef4fa9-d73a-4d1d-a288-a8ba4fd55100> [perma.cc/34TD-787M]. 
52 Supra, note 44. 
53 Estelle Pearson, David Minty & Justin Portelli, “Institutional Child Sexual Abuse: The Role & Impact of 
Redress” (Paper delivered at the Actuaries Institute Injury Schemes Seminar, Sydney, Australia, 8–10 November 
2015) [unpublished], online: <www.actuaries.asn.au/Library/Events/ACS/2015/PortelliPearsonChildAbuse.pdf> 
[perma.cc/3AG6-N7HT] at 41; See also Royal Commission, supra note 1 at 222. 
54 Gwen Reimer et al, The Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement’s Common Experience Payment and 
Healing: A Qualitative Study Exploring Impacts on Recipients (Ottawa, ON: Aboriginal Healing Foundation, 
2010), online: <www.ahf.ca/downloads/cep-2010-healing.pdf> [perma.cc/T987-LPPW] at 31–32. 
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compensation. Survivors could reasonably reject incomplete compensation as perverse—
making survivors bear the costs of the state’s compounding failures. 
Nevertheless, survivors may reasonably accept restricted compensation, if they receive 
full compensation for a limited range of injuries. It is common for programs to redress specific 
injurious “policy wrongs.”55 For example, Canada’s Common Experience Payment program, 
as part of the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement, calibrated payments according 
to the period of time that survivors were in out-of-home care, with payouts increasing in step 
with the duration of care. In total, 79,309 survivors obtained redress from that program, which 
redressed only a specific injurious experience, ignoring other abuses and all consequential 
damage.56 It serves as a model for a potential strategy. 
The envisioned strategy does not attempt to reduce the value of specific claims. Rather 
it reduces the ambit of eligible injuries. Some survivor-focused material suggests support for 
this approach.57 The demand for “effective access”58 in the VBB Principles justifies simple 
programs that are easy to understand and navigate. More limited programs target claims that 
are easier to resolve: these might be claims that are less costly for survivors or states (or both 
parties) because they require less information or use more accessible information. Limited 
ambit programs can operate more quickly than those that engage in comprehensive assessments 
and can eschew costly, invasive, and psychologically challenging assessments.59 Canada’s 
Common Experience Payment program was relatively quick and easy to negotiate.60 The 
evidence for most claims could derive from public records. Despite the large number of 
applications, the average processing time was 74.8 days per claim: 61 94 per cent of validated 
applications were paid within twenty-six months.62  
To respect the value of transparency, payment values must be publicly justifiable. This 
is hard, but not impossible. For example, if compensation is for the policy wrong of neglect, 
then the values provided might track the price of care services. Redress programs might draw 
upon a method used by American courts that prices the cost of replacing the care services a 
non-negligent parent provides. Using that technique, Andrew Laurila suggests that a single 
American parent’s nurture is “worth” around USD $1500/month between the ages of four and 
eighteen.63 In a program redressing the policy wrong of neglect, both states and survivors might 
prefer redress payments that are sensitive to injurious experiences, with payments increasing 
in step with the duration of neglect. As an indication, Canada’s Common Experience Payment 
average was CDN $20,457 (USD $15,547).64 That figure corresponds to around 4.6 years in 
                                                          
55 Daly, Redressing Abuse, supra note 3 at 126–128. 
56 For information on the Canadian program see Reimer et al, supra note 54. See also IRSSA Statistics, supra note 
47. 
57 Kathleen Mahoney & Patricia Lundy, What Survivors Want: Part Two: A Compensation Framework for 
Historic Abuses in Residential Institutions (Ulster University, 2016), online: 
<uir.ulster.ac.uk/34640/1/WSW%20FINAL%20APPROVED.pdf> [perma.cc/D9P5-QDZN] at 8–9; Graycar and 
Wangmann, supra note 6 at 7-8; Alliance for Forgotten Australians, Response to the Royal Commission 
Consultation Paper: Redress and Civil Litigaton (Alliance for Forgotten Australians, 2015), online: 
<forgottenaustralians.org.au/assets/docs/Royal-Commission/AFA-response-to-Royal-Commission-
Consultation-Paper-on-Redress-Civil-Litigation.pdf> [perma.cc/WD7Q-ZV58] at 4, 11–12. 
58 Supra, note 7, principles 3(c), 11(a). 
59 Winter, supra note 43. 
60 This is a general claim. Some survivors experienced serious problems with the program. Reimer et al, supra 
note 54. 
61 Strategic Policy and Research Branch, Evaluation of the Delivery of the Common Experience Payment: 
Evaluation Report (Ottawa, ON: Employment and Social Development Canada, 2013) at 41. 
62 As of November 2009, the program had made 74,701 payments out of an eventual total of 79,309. Reimer et 
al, supra note 54 at 6. 
63 Andrew Laurila, “Valuing Mom & Dad: Calculating Loss of Parental Nurture in a Wrongful Death Action” 
(2013) 35:1 U of La Verne L Rev 39 at 70. 
64 IRSSA Statistics, supra note 47. 
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care,65 which, using Laurila’s figure, would garner an unadjusted average payment value of 
around USD $82,800. While Laurila’s figure represents the total value of all care received by 
a minimally non-neglected child, most survivors will have received some care, therefore, they 
would not be entitled to the full sum. The redress of neglectful care could provide compensation 
on a pro rata basis, using a baseline sum appropriate to the jurisdiction. 
The range of compensable injuries addressed by a program can vary significantly, 
including or excluding differing forms of abuse and damage that appear at different times or 
over differing periods. Different survivors will have different preferences regarding the optimal 
balance between participatory costs and compensatory quantum. A limited-ambit program 
restricts the scope of eligible claims to ease access to redress. Moreover, section III observed 
the state’s interest in optimizing cost-to-output ratios by decreasing payment values as the 
number of resolved claims increases. A limited ambit program responds to the state’s interest 
in efficiency. But some survivors will prefer to pursue more complete compensation through 
processes that subject their claims to greater scrutiny, choosing not merely the prospect of 
larger monetary payments, but also the opportunity to put their personal testimony on record 
and to obtain a fuller acknowledgement of their experience. Canada gave survivors the option 
to pursue more complete compensation through the “Independent Assessment Process.”66 
Following that Canadian model, better redress programs might provide two or more “streams” 
with average monetary payments increasing in conjunction with the ambit of compensation. 
In no case should survivors be compelled to accept a non-compensatory resolution of 
their corrective justice claims. Acceptable lower value programs have a limited ambit of 
eligible injuries, not arbitrary limits to compensation. Survivors receive full compensation for 
all validated claims with values derived using robust assessment methodologies. Where full 
compensation is provided, then waivers indemnifying the state, or other parties, against further 
claims may be appropriate. But it is unreasonable to ask survivors to waive legal rights that 
have not been satisfied. Survivors should only waive claims for which they receive full 
compensation, remaining free to litigate unsatisfied claims. 
The complex policymaking involved means that better redress programs are likely to 
require deliberations with survivors or their representatives. Survivor organizations can be 
involved in every phase of policy development, including determining eligibility requirements, 
devising assessment procedures, and setting monetary values. Section II observed the 
procedural value of survivor participation. Their participation respects survivors’ agency 
interests and may aid the state in obtaining resolution, if survivor-involvement improves 
program delivery and provides a public endorsement of the program. The influence of survivors 
as program advocates is likely to be particularly important to the successful defence of 
contestable policy decisions. 
The “limited redress” strategy aims to displace the pursuit of full compensation with 
(more) accessible redress for a limited range of claims. The expectation (hope) is that many 
survivors will be satisfied with access to quicker and easier redress thereby optimizing 
resolution. Claims that remain outstanding may reduce in salience as the redress program 
attracts survivors. Previous examples indicate that this type of approach can work politically, 
when accompanied by other non-compensatory redress measures demonstrating the state’s 
commitment to the fair and equitable treatment of survivors.67 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
                                                          
65 Daly, Redressing Abuse, supra note 3 at 128. 
66 See Indian Residential Schools Adjudication Secretariat, A Guide for Claimants in the Independent Assessment 
Process, online: <www.iap-pei.ca/former-ancien/iap/claimant_guide-eng.pdf> [perma.cc/GQ26-7T3M]. 
67 Graycar & Wangmann, supra note 6 at 12–13. 
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State redress programs are a form of social policy that discharges corrective justice obligations. 
Both survivors and states have procedural and substantive criterial interests in the operation of 
redress programs. The survivors’ procedural interests in impartiality and fairness underpin the 
development of transparent programs providing sufficient support to survivors, while 
protecting their well-being and privacy. Substantively, survivors have an interest in full 
compensation for all meritorious claims. For states, redress programs will be no worse than 
litigation if they are lawful, public, effective, and efficient, the last being a substantive criterion. 
Some of the state’s and survivors’ criterial interests are congruent. Others conflict. The paper 
concluded by advancing a strategy for managing an illustrative conflict over payment values.  
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